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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26 (b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1953 as amended)

whereby a defendant in a criminal

case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final
judgment of conviction of anything other than a first degree or
capital felony.

IV.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Was Mr. Belt entrapped as a matter of law?

2.

Did the trial court err when it failed to grant Mr.

Belt's motion for a mistrial after the jury heard the charge of Mr.
Belt's offer to sell a controlled substance when the State presented
no evidence on the charge?
3.

Was Mr. Belt erroneously convicted on insufficient

evidence?

v.

TEXT OP STATUTES

Utah Code Ann, §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) provides:
Entrapment (1)
It is a defense that the actor
was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
co-operation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does
not constitute entrapment.
(2)
The defense of entrapment shall be
unavailable when causing or threatening bodily
injury is an element of the offense charged and
the prosecution is based on conduct causing or
threatening the injury to a person other than
the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3)
The defense provided by this section is
available even though the actor denies
commission of the conduct charged to constitute
the offense.
(4)
Upon written motion of the defendant, the
court shall hear evidence on the issue and
shall determine as a matter of fact and law
whether the defendant was entrapped to commit
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made
at least ten days before trial except the court
for good cause shown may permit a later filing.
(5)
Should the court determine that the
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the
case with prejudice, but if the court
determines the defendant was not entrapped,
such issue may be presented by the defendant to
the jury at trial. Any order by the court
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
VI.

(6)
In any hearing before a judge or jury
where the defense of entrapment is an issue,
past offenses of the defendant shall not be
admitted except that in a trial where the
defendant testifies he may be asked of his past
convictions for felonies and any testimony
given by the defendant at a hearing on
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony
at trial.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) provides in
pertinent part:
Receiving stolen property — (1)
A person
commits theft if he receives, retains, or
disposes of the property of another knowing
that it has been stolen, or believing that it
probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding any such property from
the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
(2)
The knowledge or belief required for
paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an
actor who:
(a) Is found in possession or control of
other property stolen on a separate
occasion; or
(b) Has received other stolen property
within the year preceding the receiving
offense charged; or
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort
received, retained, or disposed, acquires it
for a consideration which he knows is far
below its reasonable value.

vn.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

vs.

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

LYNN L. BELT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 880169-CA
Category No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted the appellant, Lynn L. Belt, of two
counts of Theft by Receiving, second and third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) on October
15, 1987. Mr. Belt appeals from a judgment and conviction for these
crimes in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge,
presiding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some time in June, 1986, at Dee's Family Restaurant,
located at 2100 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Officer Illsley
left the phone area and approached Lynn Belt who was standing near
the counter.

Illsley commented to Mr. Belt that "he wished Galen

would get a phone, it was hard to get hold of him."

Although an

acquaintance of "Galen," Mr. Belt did not respond to Illsley's
comment (T. 9). Prior to this encounter, Mr. Belt testified that he
had first seen Illsley at the West Valley City Police Department and
was under the impression that Illsley was a police officer

(Mr. Rod Lackau, an acquaintance of Mr. Belt, testified that Mr.Belt
had told him that Illsley was a police officer with a friend who
worked on the dock (T. 158)).

Mr. Belt also saw Illsley at Dee's

eating a few times and Illsley had said "hi" to him a few times
before (T. 207-08) .
As a sergeant in the Metro Major Felony Unit of the Metro
Narcotics Strike Force, Officer Illsley was on undercover assignment
(T. 6 ) . His operation targeted certain people and one of those
people was Mr. Belt (T. 14, 77). Thus, Illsley purchased three
five-inch portable television sets at Skagg's Alpha Beta in West
Valley City for $301 with the specific intent to offer them for sale
to Mr. Belt (T. 10, 14). Officer Illsley cut the serial numbers,
store name, and other information from the T.V. boxes and placed
them in his 1977 blue Camaro before driving to Dee's Family
Restaurant at 5:40 p.m. on the eighth of July, 1986 (T. 11, 14).
While at Dee's, Officer Illsley observed Belt and another
individual in the northeast corner of the parking lot standing next
to Mr. Belt's semi-truck (T. 10, 15). Illsley drove alongside the
truck, called "Lynn," and asked him to come over to his car
(T. 209). Illsley asked Belt if he would be seeing Galen later.
Belt replied that he saw Galen every day.

Illsley then proceeded to

uncover the T.V. sets under the blanket and stated, "Tell Galen I
have these."
for the sets.

(T. 16). Mr. Belt asked him how much he was asking
Illsley said "one bill" to which Mr. Belt responded

that he could "get them in the store for less than that."
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Illsley

then answered that he meant one bill for all three of them (T. 17,
193).

Illsley testified he knew similar T.V.s could be purchased

for $50 and even less.

He was also aware T.V.s could be bought for

ridiculously low prices at swap meets (T. 76). Officer Illsley
further testified he did not tell Mr. Belt that the T.V.s were
stolen (T. 81).
Testimony differs as to the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.

Officer Illsley testified there was no conversation

about where the T.V.s came from and further that he did not
volunteer the information (T. 83). Mr. Belt testified he inquired
about the origin of the sets and asked Officer Illsley, "How come
the name of the store was cut off the box?"

Mr. Belt said Illsley

responded "oh, they cut that off because a friend of mine works on
the dock, and they cut it off so that you can't take it back and get
a full refund of your money" (T. 193). Mr. Belt's wife and
daughter, seated in the car waiting for Mr. Belt to end his
conversation with Mr. Illsley, each testified that when Mr. Belt
asked his wife for $100 to buy three small televisions he told them
that they were overage from the dock (T. 126, 136).
Illsley testified he pointed to the boxes and told Mr.
Belt he had "peeled the serial numbers off. There won't be a hassle
on it."
. . . ."

Illsley testified Mr. Belt said he would "s

can them

(T. 18). However, the serial numbers were not removed

from the T.V. sets themselves (T. 84). And as Officer Illsley
testified, peeling the serial number off the box does not solve the
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problem of dealing in stolen property because police can still check
the serial number on the set.

Illsley also stated Mr. Belt did not

ask him to remove the serial numbers from the sets themselves (T.
85-87).

In fact, no serial numbers were ever removed from any of

the products purchased by Mr. Belt from Officer Illsley (T. 85).
The following day, July 9th, Mr Belt discussed the
situation with Jerry Hobbs, a recently retired sergeant from the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's office.

Mr. Belt inquired about having

one of Mr. Hobb's friends in the sheriff's office run a National
Crime Information Center, or "NCIC" check on the televisions' serial
numbers (T. 114, 194). Jerry Hobbs verified he was contacted by Mr.
Belt in June or July of 1986 and was told that Mr. Belt had the
opportunity to buy a "television set or two" and wanted him to check
to see if the sets could be stolen (T. 118). Mr. Hobbs said that he
never heard back from Mr. Belt (T. 118).
However, Mr. Belt testified he did not follow through
with Mr. Hobbs because the next day Kenny Wheeler told him that an
NCIC check on the T.V. he purchased from Mr. Belt had been negative
(T. 195). Mr. Wheeler was dating Mr. Belt's daughter and for thirty
three dollars purchased one of the three sets obtained from Mr.
Illsley for the same price. On his way home from Mr.Belt's home,
Wheeler was stopped by the Lehi police who called in the serial
number of the set and then released Wheeler.

Worried, Mr. Wheeler

had another officer in Lehi, Cory Healey, run an NCIC check on the
television.

This NCIC check also proved negative (T. 145-47, 153).
- 4 -

Mr. Wheeler conveyed this information to Mr. Belt on the 10th of
July, indicating his television had not been reported stolen (T.
146).
The next contact between Mr. Belt and Officer Illsley
occurred at Dee's on July 18th at 10:00 p*m.

Earlier in the day,

Illsley purchased a VHF video recorder at Silo in Sandy for $299.00
(T. 21). He placed the video recorder in his car trunk and later
arrived at Dee's at 9:30 p.m. (T. 20-22).

Within a half hour of his

arrival, Illsley saw Belt leaving the restaurant with some friends.
Illsley followed them outside and after Belt separated from some of
the individuals, he called to Belt and asked if he had a minute. He
told Belt that he had a video recorder and Mr. Belt asked how much
it would cost.

Illsley said $100. Mr. Belt asked if it were a good

one and Illsley said it was brand new (T. 23). Mr. Belt and Mr.
Illsley then each proceeded to their cars.

Mr. Belt, with Richard

Jewkes in his car, pulled alongside Illsley's car in the parking
lot.

Illsley opened his trunk and showed the box to Mr. Belt and,

according to Illsley, told him "I got it off a truck and there
wouldn't be a problem with it." (T. 24). Mr. Belt made no response
and paid $100 for the VCR (T. 25). Then Illsley said he had three
more VCRs in boxes and asked if Mr. Belt were interested.

Belt said

to call him, ending the conversation (T. 25, 200).
Illsley testified that after several phone calls, he made
contact with Mr. Belt and arranged to meet him for coffee on the
20th of July at 10:00 p.m.

Illsley was fitted with a wireless
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transmitter and had placed in his car three VCRs which he purchased
on the 19th.

Illsley paid between $1200 and $1300 for the VCRs.

Serial numbers, model numbers and store identification had been
removed from the boxes (T. 27-32).
when Illsley arrived.

Mr. Belt was outside waiting

Illsley suggested they go to the back of the

parking lot which Mr. Belt described as "very dark."

Belt testified

he was concerned why Illsley wanted him back in the dark corner of
the lot. He had also seen a gun Illsley kept in his back pocket (T.
201).

Mr. Illsley verified he had "on occasion" carried a Beretta

25 caliber pistol in his back pocket (T. 231). Because of his
concern, Mr. Belt asked Mr. Illsley to follow him six blocks to a
well-lit parking lot at Deseret Industries (T. 201). Officer
Illsley testified that after arriving at the parking lot in front of
Deseret Industries, Mr. Belt told him "I checked you out with
Galen."

"If you weren't a friend of Galen's, I wouldn't even be

talking to you" and that there "wouldn't be any heat ever on
anything."

(T. 39-40).

Mr. Belt paid $300 for the three video

recorders (T. 37). Mr. Belt testified further that Officer Illsley
asked if there were anything in particular that would come off an
electronics dock that Mr. Belt would be interested in.

Mr. Belt

answered in the affirmative saying that a brother wanted a T.V. and
he wanted a video camera (T. 221).
On July 23, Officer Illsley next spoke to Mr. Belt (T.
42, 203-04).

Illsley called Mr. Belt and asked for Mr. Belt to

return his call.

When Belt called, Illsley asked if he were calling
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from a pay phone.

Belt responded no.

from a pay phone.

Belt called from a pay phone at Dee's since he

was going there anyway.

Illsley asked him to call

Illsley invited him to his house

(T. 203-04/ 219). The house was used for undercover operations and
was equipped with a microphone, video camera and T.V. monitor
(T. 44).
Mr. Belt entered the house at 10:00 p.m. (T. 45).
Officer Illsley testified that Mr. Belt was reluctant or paranoid at
the undercover house.

Illsley indicated numerous times that

everything was "okay/1 everything was "checked-out" and that there
would be "no problems."

Illsley testified these assurances were

part of his effort to build his own credibility as a crook and were
not made to sell the equipment (T. 66-67).

Mr. Belt testified

Illsley was acting "screwy and squirrelly" at the undercover house.
Mr. Belt asked where the T.V. came from and asked whether it was
"boosted."

Mr. Belt decided that if there were something wrong he

could get in trouble so he told Illsley he did not want to know
where it came from (T. 205). Illsley reassured Mr. Belt, "I didn't
boost it, it's off the dock." (T. 207). Mr. Belt eventually
purchased the T.V. for $100 (T. 52).

|

During the course of the trial Illsley testified he and
Mr. Belt had a conversation regarding "crank," a street name for
methamphetamine (T. 54). Illsley also testified that in response to
Illsley's requests for crank, Mr. Belt said he "had a guy who was
looking at crank." (T. 57). According to Illsley, Mr. Belt quoted
- 7 -

prices for specific amounts.

id.

In a subsequent telephone

conversation, Illsley testified Mr. Belt indicated "the deal . . .
is off.11 (T. 59). There were no other conversations regarding
crank.

Id.
Mr. Belt was charged in Count I, Theft by Receiving for

purchase of the three black and white televisions on or about July
8, 1986. The jury found him not guilty of this Count.

He was also

charged in Count II with Theft by Receiving for purchasing the
single VCR on or about July 8, 1986, and similarly found not guilty
on this Count.

The jury convicted him of Count III, Theft by

Receiving for the three VCRs purchased on or about July 20, 1986 and
of Count IV, Theft by Receiving for the nineteen inch television
purchased on or about July 23, 1986. The trial court dismissed
Count Vf Offering, Agreeing or Arranging to Distribute for Value a
Controlled Substance, on motion of the defense for insufficient
evidence after the State's case in chief (T. 113).
Subsequent to the dismissal of Count V, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial on the grounds Mr. Belt was denied a fair trial
once the jury became tainted by hearing an allegation of and
testimony about a crime the State could not prove.

His motion was

denied (T. 113).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, the conduct and methods employed by Sergeant
Illsley in procuring the sale of items to Mr. Belt that would
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result in a criminal conviction constituted entrapment as defined by
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) and Utah case law.
Mr. Belt was induced by Sergeant Illsley to believe that
the sales and purchases of a T.V. and three VCRs were not prohibited
by the law.

Furthermore/ Sergeant Illsley1s behavior was

overreaching in luring the specific target/ Mr. Belt/ into the
commission of a crime.
Secondly, the trial court erred by not declaring a
mistrial after it dismissed the charge against Mr. Belt of offering
to sell a controlled substance following the State's case in chief
during which a discussion about crank was the only evidence
presented.

The presentation of that evidence had as a purpose the

casting of Mr. Belt as a person of evil character with the
propensity to commit crime and that he was thus likely to have
committed the crimes for which he was convicted, contrary to the
trial standards laid down by Utah case law. The tactics which
originally followed introduction of the evidence had as a result the
circumvention of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Third/ evidence presented was insufficient to convict Mr.
Belt of two counts of theft by receiving.

The State failed to

present sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Belt knew or believed
the property had probably been stolen as required by Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-408.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR, BELT WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER OF LAW
Utah Code Ann.
defense of entrapment.
Motion (Addendum A).

§76-2-303 (1953 as amended) codifies the

Mr. Belt filed the appropriate Entrapment

The statute provides, in pertinent part:

(1) . . . . Entrapment occurs when a law
enforcement officer . . . induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does
not constitute entrapment.
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496
(Utah 1979) reversed the defendant's conviction and clarified the
Utah standard for establishing entrapment.

The Court indicated an

objective standard of assessing the police conduct would henceforth
control entrapment law in Utah.

Rather than focus on the

"propensities and predispositions" of a specific defendant, analysis
would focus instead on whether police conduct fell below certain
"standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of
governmental power."

Id. at 500 referring to Hampton v. United

States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed. 2d 113 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

A reviewing court should consider

whether the conduct of the government in any given case "comport[s]
with a fair and honorable administration of justicef.] . . ."

State

v. Taylor, at 500. Although the government cannot engage in
"manufacture of crime," the government can present opportunity for
- 10 -

the commission of crime.

Id.

Likewise, government agents cannot

lure a person into the commission of a crime. Id.
In Taylor, the Court closely examined the issue of the
past conduct of the accused and spe.cif ically rejected focusing on
"propensities and predispositions" of the accused when it declined
to adopt a subjective analysis for the defense of entrapment. The
Court stated:
No matter what the defendant's past record and
present inclinations to criminality, or the
depths to which he has sunk in the estimation
of society, certain police conduct to ensnare
him into further crime is not to be tolerated
by an advanced society.
Id. at 502.
According to the Court in Taylor, Utah's entrapment
statute closely parallels language of the Model Penal Code 1962
Proposed Official Draft. That provision stated in part:
(1) A public law enforcement official . . .
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an
offense, he induces or encourages another
person to engage in conduct constituting such
offense by either:
(a) making knowingly fallse
representations designed to induce the
belief that such conduct is not
prohibited; . . .
State v. Taylor, at 502.
The late Justice Maughan's dissent in State v. Bridwell,
566 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1977) articulated the objective standard
for judging entrapment before it became the law in Utah.
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He noted

the defense of entrapment was to promote a social policy and quoted
from the Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 9, §2.10, p.15 (1959):
It is consistent with [preventing men from
engaging in socially harmful conduct] to
recognize a defense based upon those unsavory
police methods which have the effect of
fostering criminality.
State v. Bridwell at 1236, Maughan, J., dissenting.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction in State
v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984) because it found the offense
had been induced by persistent requests by the officers.

As noted

in Taylor, luring someone into the commission of an offense will not
be tolerated.
In State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court again examined police behavior and found it had
overreaching.

been

In that case, the undercover officer sold jewelry to

the defendant as part of a sting operation.
jewelry as not being stolen.

She represented the

She also said she was a divorced woman

supporting six children who tutored math and gave piano lessons.
Kaufman, at 466. At another meeting with the defendant after the
defendant tried to establish a more intimate relationship with her,
she told him the jewelry she had previously sold to him was stolen
property.

Id.

at 467. Kaufman, however, did not report the

incident to the police.

I_d.

Despite Kaufman's conduct in not going

to the police once he knew the jewelry was stolen, his convictions
for receiving stolen property were reversed.

The Court reasoned the

undercover officer was not only selling stolen merchandise, she was
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also selling herself as an "attractive, relatively young, divorced
mother of six children who was having hard times."

Kaufman, at 468.

In the case at bar, the police were also conducting a
sting operation.

No property was stolen because Officer Illsley had

purchased the three televisions from a store in West Valley City
(T. 10). Likewise, Illsley had purchased the video recorder at a
store in Sandy (T. 20-21).

The televisions were specifically bought

with the intent to sell them to Mr. Belt (T. 77). Because Mr. Belt
was somewhat wary of Officer Illsley1s conduct, he attempted to
ascertain whether the goods might have been stolen.

In particular,

Mr. Belt was concerned because the serial numbers had been removed
from the boxes (T. 60). Officer Illsley also testified Mr. Belt
asked Illsley to leave the serial numbers on the box and "just kind
of scrape the store names off so you can't read it."

Ij3. Mr. Belt

testified he believed the store names had been cut off the boxes to
prevent the owner from exchanging these items at the stores for full
value (T. 193).
When Mr. Belt first

examined the VCR in Illsley's trunk,

he was told by Illsley it had been removed from a truck and there
would not be a problem with it (T. 24). Once he was assured by
Illsley the goods were not stolen, Mr. Belt paid $100 for the
merchandise (T. 25). Illsley himself recognized similar televisions
could be purchased for fifty or sixty dollars or even less at swap
meets (T. 76).
At a subsequent meeting with Illsley during which Illsley
sold three VCRs to Mr. Belt, Mr. Belt indicated he had no preference
- 13 -

for removing warranty cards and serial numbers in response to
lllsley's descriptions of what various other customers wanted (T.
38).

Illsley told Mr, Belt there would not be any heat ever, on

anything (T. 40). Illsley represented the equipment as "overages"
off the dock and further indicated the surpluses were such that
"they [wouldn't] even know it was missing/' and again indicated
there "wouldn't be any heat." (T. 60).*
Illsley never did say the merchandise was stolen
(T. 81). In fact, when Mr. Belt specifically suggested the items
might be "boosted," Illsley denied the items were "boosted."
(T. 100). To Mr. Belt, "boosted" meant stolen (T. 206). To
Illsley, the term "boosted" is limited to shoplifting (T. 101).
Although Mr. Belt told Illsley he really did not want to
know the origins of the goods (T. 60, 205) and again expressed
concern the items might be boosted, Illsley interrupted him and
assured him there would not be any heat (T. 60, 206). Illsley never
volunteered any information about where the items came from except
that the items came off the dock (T. 83, 206). Another indication
to Mr. Belt that the items were not stolen was lllsley's failure to
remove the serial numbers from the television sets.

Mr. Belt knew

peeling the serial numbers off the boxes would not solve the problem
if the goods were stolen (T. 85-87).

Mr. Belt contacted

1

Although Illsley denied having told Mr. Belt the
televisions or VCRs were overages, (T. 230) that information could
not be verified from the tapes which were intact.
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Jerry Hobbs, an employee recently retired after twenty-seven years
with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to have him check to see
if the televisions might be stolen, but Mr. Hobbs never followed
through (T. 118). Mr. Belt was not too concerned about getting back
to Hobbs because Mr. Wheeler had already checked the sets (T. 194).
Kenny Wheeler, who purchased one of the televisions from Mr. Belt,
was pulled over in Lehi (T. 147). Although the police ran a check
on the set in his car on the NCIC computer, the results of the check
were negative (T. 153).
Two others who bought the goods from Mr.Belt also
testified at trial. Jay Price had been told the five-inch
television, the VCR and the nineteen inch television were "overages
off the dock."

(T. 174). He, too, thought the names and addresses

of the stores had been removed to prevent return of the items to the
stores for refunds (T. 175). Doyle Harris was told by Mr. Belt he
could get a VCR for $100. When Mr. Harris asked if the item were
stolen, Mr. Belt said "No. The serial number is right on there."
(T. 185). Mr. Harris was told the price was low because the item
might be a second or damaged (T. 184).
It is significant that Mr. Belt made no profit on the
items he purchased and resold (T. 169, 173, 203, 206). It is also
significant that Illsley persisted in making phone calls to
Mr. Belt. According to Illsley1s records, seventeen phone calls
were made, sixteen of which were recorded (T. 92). Fourteen of the
sixteen calls were initiated by Illsley (T. 94). Mr. Belt often
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told his family members to say he was not home when Illsley called
(T. 127-78, 138).
In the case at bar, Illsley's conduct fell below a level
that our society should tolerate*

Illsley misled Mr. Belt into

believing the property was not stolen because he said it was not
boosted.

Illsley contacted Mr. Belt time and time again and

Mr. Belt only called Illsley a few times to return phone calls.
Although Mr. Belt was somewhat wary of the low prices Illsley
presented, he believed he was simply dealing with surplus goods.
Mr. Belt simply bought and resold the items.

For these reasons, Mr.

Belt was entrapped into committing a crime and his convictions
should be reversed.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DECLARE A
MISTRIAL AFTER IT DISMISSED THE CHARGE OF
OFFERING TO SELL A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOLLOWING THE STATE'S
CASE IN CHIEF.
Mr. Belt was charged in Count V with Offering, Agreeing
or Arranging to Distribute for Value a Controlled Substance.

The

State's only evidence pertaining to this charge related to a
conversation between Mr. Illsley and Mr. Belt.

Mr. Illsley

requested Mr. Belt to find some "crank" and Mr. Belt supposedly
quoted prices but then indicated the deal was off (T. 54, 57, 59).
The trial court dismissed the charge for insufficient evidence on
defense counsel's motion following the State's case in chief
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(T. 113). However, the court then refused to grant a motion for a
mistrial.
The Utah Supreme Court has followed a longstanding policy
of limiting admission of evidence of other crimes allegedly
committed by the accused "if the purpose is to disgrace the
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit
crime and thus likely to have committed the crime charged."

State

v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978)(footnote omitted).

In

Daniels, the Court found the challenged admission that the defendant
had siphoned gas was relevant, and therefore properly admitted, to
explain circumstances surrounding his lack of money and his motive
for theft, the crime he was accused and convicted of.
Again in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), the
Supreme Court examined a similar issue and reversed the conviction
because of the erroneous and prejudicial admission of another
crime.

In that case, two men stole a car.

While in the car, the

driver committed a robbery by pointing a gun at someone and forcing
him to get in the car and hand over his money.

The State contended

the crime was relevant to show both possession of the car and
cooperation in that possession between the driver and Holder.
Although the Court found evidence of the robbery was relevant, it
also found the evidence was merely cumulative on the issue of
possession and cooperation.

Therefore evidence of the robbery

carried limited value when weighed against the "substantial
possibility that [the] jury would be prejudiced . . . ." 694 P.2d at
584.
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In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the
Supreme Court again reversed a conviction because the trial court
erroneously denied a motion to sever and evidence of a prior
conviction, admissible to prove a firearm charge was prejudicial to
the defendant on the burglary charge.

Such evidence is presumed

prejudicial and "absent a reason for the admission of the evidence
other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded."
699 P.2d at 741. Limitations on admissibility of other crimes is
needed to protect the accused from the possibility of basing a
conviction on bad character rather than on a showing of evidence to
support guilt on the crime charged.

Id.

The Court noted the Rules

of Evidence are designed to protect against such undue prejudice.
Id.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
In the instant case, the discussion about crank was the
only evidence proferred by the State to support the charge of
Offering, Agreeing or Arranging to Distribute for Value a Controlled
Substance (T. 54-59).

The State could not, therefore, prove the

elements of the offense which would have required proof of an actual
offer or agreement to obtain a controlled substance for value. Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(IV) (1953 as amended).
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Instead, the State

only utilized the evidence to infer Mr. Belt was a "bad character"
and had a propensity for criminal activity.

Such an inference of a

criminal disposition was particularly prejudicial in the instant
case because Mr. Belt's credibility in portraying to the jury he did
not believe the property was stolen was paramount.
The introduction of evidence under the guise that it
could substantiate the specific crime charged was a tactic employed
by the State to circumvent Rule 404(b).

It was a tactic that

allowed the State to introduce evidence which directly inferred
Mr. Belt had a criminal disposition rather than prove guilt on the
underlying charge.

There was no legitimate reason for the State to

elicit the testimony.
Absent this error, there is a reasonable likelihood
Mr. Belt would not have been convicted.

Therefore, under the

rationale of Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Mr. Belt's
convictions should be reversed.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
MR. BELT OF TWO COUNTS OF THEFT BY RECEIVING.
Mr. Belt was found guilty following his jury trial of
Count III, Theft by Receiving, a second degree felony in that on or
about July 20, 1986, he received the property of another, (three
VCR's) believing that the property had probably been stolen, with a
purpose to deprive the owner and the value of the property exceeded
$1,000.00.

He was also convicted on Count IV, Theft by Receiving, a
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third degree felony m

that on or about July 23, 1986, he received

property of another (a nineteen inch television) believing that the
property had probably been stolen, with a purpose to deprive the
owner thereof and that value of the property was more than $250,00
but less than $1,000.00.
The relevant portion of Utah's Theft by Receiving statute

(1) A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing
that it probably has been stolen, or who
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
concealing, selling, or withholding any such
property to be stolen, with a purpose to
deprive the owner thereof.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for
paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an
actor who:
(a) Is found in possession or control of
other property stolen on a separate
occasion, or
(b) Has received other stolen property
within the year preceding the receiving
offense charged; or
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort
received, retained, or disposed, acquires it
for a consideration which he knows is far
below its reasonable value.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended).

Utah's legislature has

indicated the mental state required for the commission of an offense
in Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101 (1953 as amended)

That section states:

No person is guilty of an offense unless his
conduct is prohibited by law and:
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(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with respect to each element
of the offense as the definition of the
offense requires, . . . .
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443
(Utah 1983) set forth the standard for reversing a criminal
conviction on insufficient evidence:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
Id. at 444 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar the State failed to prove Mr. Belt
knew or believed the property probably had been stolen as required
by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408. None of the categories of subsection
two (2) of the statute applies to Mr. Belt because he was neither
found in.possession or control of other property on another occasion
nor did he receive other stolen property within the year preceding
the offense.

Similarly, he was neither a dealer in this type of

goods nor was he a pawnbroker.

Therefore, Mr. Belt must have known

or believed the property he bought was stolen for the convictions to
stand.
Testimony adduced at trial indicated property could be
traced through NCIC checks by the police as long as serial numbers
remained on the property (T. 87, 106, 117). Mr. Belt knew this
because he expressed concern over Illsley's having even removed the
serial number from the box (T. 106). When Illsley tried to press
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Mr, Belt by asking him what his preference would be regarding
removal of warranty cards and serial numbers and by telling Mr. Belt
his other customers had various preferences regarding these things,
Mr. Belt replied he had no preference (T.38).

If Mr. Belt had

knowledge or belief the goods were stolen, it would be logical for
him to want the serial numbers and warranty cards removed.

Illsley

had only removed the serial number and store identification from one
of the three VCRs Mr. Belt purchased (T. 38). Mr. Belt did nothing
to remove the serial numbers from the remaining items because he
believed the items were not stolen (T. 196).
Although Illsley told Mr. Belt the value of one of the
VCRs was $700 he never mentioned the value of the other two VCRs
(T. 37). There was no testimony to indicate Mr. Belt believed the
property was stolen.

Although Illsley denied having told Mr. Belt

the property was "off the dock,"

Mr. Belt testified Illsley

repeatedly told him the store identification and serial numbers were
simply removed so the items could not be exchanged for full refund
(T. 193) and further that the property was "off the dock" (T. 199,
200, 202, 206). Mr. Belt also testified that when Illsley asked him
if there were anything else he might want from the electronics dock,
Mr. Belt indicated he would like a VCR camera if one became
available through overage (T. 198-200, 204).
Likewise, when Mr. Belt bought the nineteen inch
television from Illsley for $100, he had no knowledge or belief the
set was stolen.

Although he did pay less then the represented
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market value for the television (T. 51-52), Illsley had told him
previously "There wouldn't ever —
this stuff . . . .

wouldn't be any heat on any of

[T]here wouldn't be any heat ever on anything"

(T. 40). Illsley also denied having "boosted" the property
(T. 100), and although the term carried slightly different meanings
to the two men, Mr. Belt thought it meant stolen (T. 60, 101, 206).
Even though Illsley acted "screwy and squirrelly"
according to Mr. Belt, and Mr. Belt did not want to be told if
anything were wrong, Mr. Belt thought he could rely on Illsley's
representation that the goods were "off the dock" (T. 199, 200,
206).

Mr. Belt believed he was buying items at low prices and only

sold them for the same prices (T. 206).
One of the televisions which Mr. Belt purchased from
Illsley and which he then resold to Mr. Wheeler was checked by the
Lehi police and by an individual officer who testified at trial and
found not to be listed as stolen (T. 146, 153, 196). This provided
further assurance to Mr. Belt Illsley was not selling him stolen
property.

Mr. Belt had no reason to believe the rest of the

property would have been any different.

Mr. Belt had additional

grounds to believe he was operating in a legitimate fashion because
he had "checked out" Illsley through his friend Galen (T. 39).
Therefore, under the standard set forth in State v.
Petree, reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt
Mr. Belt committed the crimes of Theft by Receiving for which he was
convicted in Counts III and IV.

His convictions ought to be
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reversed because the State failed to prove he either knew or
believed the three VCRs or the nineteen inch television were stolen.

CONCLUSION

For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks
reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to the District
Court for dismissal of the charges or in the alternative a new trial
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ADDENDUM A

LYNN R. BROWN (0460)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER.ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELY
ON DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
and NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.
LYNN LLOYD BELT.,

Case No. CR86-1378
Judge KENNETH RIGTRUP

Defendant.

The defendant, LYNN LLOYD BELT, by and through his attorne;
of record, LYNN R. BROWN, herein gives notice of the defendant's
intent to rely on the defense of entrapment in the above-entitled
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S76-2-303 (1953 as amended).
DATED this / /

day of May, 1987.

IYNN R,. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND^THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the
day of Mayr 1987 at the hour of

.m. before the Honorable

KENNETH RIGTRUP/ Judgef Third District Court.

Please govern

yourselves accordingly.

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent to Rely
on Defense of Entrapment and Notice of Hearing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's/ Office, 231 East Fourth South/ Salt Lake City/
Utah 84111/ this

day of May, 1987.
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